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INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment guarantees the right of free speech, both 
written and spoken, to all Americans.  Such protection is not 
limited to words that can be directly tied to the speaker; 
anonymous speech is protected as well.1  Since the Founding Era, 
anonymous speech has played a significant role in American 
history, influencing both court rulings and free speech traditions.2  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that anonymous 
speech has value and is protected by the First Amendment. 3  
Regardless of the value inherent in anonymous speech, however, it 
is not afforded unlimited First Amendment protection. 
Anonymous speech is prevalent in all of cyberspace.  From 
anonymous product reviews to message boards, the Internet 
provides the medium for the instantaneous flow of speech, which 
is often hateful and destructive.  This speech is couched in 
anonymity to protect the speaker from retribution and often would 
not be said in a face-to-face confrontation for fear of a violent 
response.  Although the Supreme Court has ruled that First 
Amendment protections apply in cyberspace, the Court has not yet 
defined the extent to which anonymous online speech can be 
protected or regulated.4 
The First Amendment does not protect all speech equally; 
rather, certain categories of speech are disfavored and do not 
                                                                                                             
1 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 
150 (2002); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
2 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison published the Federalist Papers 
anonymously.  All papers were published under the name “Publius.”  The Anti-Federalist 
Papers were also published anonymously.  These were written under pseudonyms 
including “Cato,” “Brutus,” “Centinel,” and “Federal Farmer.” 
3 See, e.g., Watchtower, 536 U.S. 150; McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; Talley, 362 U.S. 60. 
4 See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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receive the presumptive protection that such categories as political 
speech do. 5   Two categories of disfavored speech are speech 
inciting violence and fighting words.6  The Supreme Court has 
held that states can constitutionally proscribe speech that is 
directed to incite imminent lawless action and that will likely incite 
or produce such action.7  Fighting words, on the other hand, are 
classified as speech in which the violence is directed against the 
speaker.  In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court 
defined fighting words as “those which by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”8 
A crucial factor for the Supreme Court in determining whether 
or not speech falls into one of these categories is the imminence 
and likelihood of violent action.9  In the Founding Era, the press 
was not immediate, but hot news needed to be printed and 
subsequently distributed.  Therefore, it was unlikely that written 
speech in the press would cause imminent lawless action.  Today, 
however, cyberspace is intimately intertwined with everyday life.  
With cell phones and Wi-Fi hotspots, the Internet is constantly at 
individuals’ fingertips and messages are transmitted 
instantenously.  Regulations of speech in cyberspace should 
therefore be examined in terms of speech freedom rather than press 
freedom. 
This Note proceeds in three parts.  Part I discusses the history 
of the First Amendment’s protections for anonymous speech and 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding state regulation of 
speech.  Part II discusses the recent prevalence of Internet 
cyberbullying and the First Amendment challenges posed by any 
attempts to regulate anonymous speech online.  Part II also 
                                                                                                             
5 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 1017 (4th ed. 2011). 
6 See id. 
7 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 
290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). 
8 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding 
that the words “Fuck the Draft” did not rise to the level of fighting words because there 
was no showing of actual violence intended or aroused). 
9 See, e.g., Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886; Cohen, 403 U.S. 15; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444. 
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explores the arguments for and against regulating anonymous 
online speech, as well as the extent to which that speech may be 
constitutionally proscribed.  Part III argues that cyberbullying is 
analogous to fighting words because the intimacy of social media 
makes cyberspeech more like a verbal assault than a printed 
communication.  As such, states should be able to regulate 
anonymous cyberspeech in the same manner and to the same 
extent that they may regulate the spoken word. 
I. LEGAL EVOLUTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that “Congress shall make no law [ . . . ] abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”10  Traditionally, the right to 
free speech has been considered of the utmost importance to 
Americans.  Despite the profound importance of free speech, 
however,  it is widely recognized and accepted that the First 
Amendment has limits and does not universally protect any and all 
speech.  This Part discusses the evolution of First Amendment 
jurisprudence for all speech.  Part I.A explores the history of 
anonymous speech regulation.  Part I.B discusses the way the 
Court has dealt with state regulation of speech with an identifiable 
author.  Part I.C explores the detrimental effects cyberbullying has 
on children and teenagers, providing specific examples of the harm 
caused by unrestricted cyberspeech. 
A. History of Anonymous Speech Regulation 
The First Amendment has protected anonymous speech since 
the Founding Era.  Historically, freedom of speech has been 
justified for three main reasons: advancing knowledge and truth in 
the marketplace of ideas; facilitating representative democracy and 
self-government; and promoting individual autonomy, self-
expression and self-fulfillment. 11   Anonymous speech has been 
held to have inherent value and is thus protected by the First 
                                                                                                             
10 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
11 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 954–58.  
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Amendment.12  From an originalist perspective, the mere fact that 
anonymous speech was allowed and protected during the Founding 
Era is enough to justify the protection of anonymous speech today.  
However, there are prudential concerns to this argument, as the 
goal was arguably not to protect vicious anonymous hate speech 
and harassment. 
Since the Founding Era, anonymous speech has been used to 
further public discourse.  Three influential thinkers and Framers of 
the Constitution availed themselves of the right to publish 
anonymous speech in producing the Federalist Papers. 13  
Consisting of eighty-five different essays that encourage the 
adoption of and deliberation about the new Constitution, the 
Federalist Papers were written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, 
and James Madison, and were published under the pseudonym 
Publius.14   Anti-Federalists in the Founding Era also published 
pseudonymous works, using such names as Cato, Brutus, Centinel, 
and Founding Farmer.15 
Throughout history, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the 
First Amendment also protects anonymous speech.  In 1960, the 
Court struck down a California ban on anonymous handbills.16  
Justice Black, in declaring the statute unconstitutional, explicitly 
stated that “[a]nonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even 
books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.”17  
Furthermore, Justice Black went on to hold that identification 
requirements restrict both freedom to distribute information and 
freedom of expression and, further, that anonymity is often used 
for constructive purposes.18  In 1995, the Supreme Court again 
held that the First Amendment protects anonymous speech in 
                                                                                                             
12 See id. at 1002. 
13 See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 1–85 (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay & James 
Madison) (Goldwin Smith ed., 1901). 
14 See generally id. 
15 See generally THE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WRITINGS BY THE OPPONENTS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (Herbert J. Storing ed., abridged, 1985). 
16 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
17 Id. at 64. 
18 Id. at 64–65. 
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McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.19  In McIntyre, the Court 
struck down a law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous 
campaign literature, noting that political expression would be 
burdened if the law were to be maintained.  The McIntyre Court 
further held that the regulation at issue was subject to strict 
scrutiny because of its content-based nature.20  Anonymous speech, 
therefore, has inherent value and is thus accorded high First 
Amendment protections, and regulation of such speech must be 
reviewed under strict scrutiny. 
Anonymity allows an individual to be judged solely by the 
content of his or her speech rather than any personal opinion 
people may have of the author.  Anonymity encourages 
participation in the political process without fear of retribution.21  
Margot Kaminski, Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School, points to 
recent anti-mask laws to claim that the Supreme Court has upheld 
anonymous speech protections beyond political speech to protect 
all forms of free expression. 22   Addressing free expression 
protection, Kaminski also notes that “pure anonymity  . . .  will 
become increasingly expressive,” pointing to the Internet as a 
medium for spreading anonymous speech.23 
The Supreme Court has upheld certain regulations pertaining to 
anonymous speech that require identity disclosure.  Specifically in 
the area of campaign finance, the Court has found that such 
disclosure requirements do not violate First Amendment rights.  In 
Buckley v. Valeo, the Court upheld the portion of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971 requiring disclosure of the 
identities of campaign donors to every political candidate and 
committee. 24   Finding that the government had a significant 
interest in maintaining the integrity of the political process, 
                                                                                                             
19 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
20 See id. at 370; see also Sophia Qasir, Note, Anonymity in Cyberspace: Judicial & 
Legislative Regulations, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3651, 3664 (2013). 
21 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 1002.  
22 See generally Margot Kiminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying 
Anti-Mask Case Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 815 (2013). 
23 Id. at 896. 
24 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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deterring corruption, and enforcing expenditure limits, the Court 
held that the government’s interests outweighed individual speech 
rights through use of a balancing test.25   However, this ruling, 
which indicated the moment when governmental interests 
outweigh free speech rights, was limited to the context of 
campaign finance. 
Regulation of anonymous speech on the Internet has not yet 
been conclusively established by the Supreme Court and poses an 
interesting question for legal scholars.  Indeed, numerous scholars 
continue to speculate on the limits of online protections of 
speech. 26   Couched in anonymity, individuals have taken to 
cyberspace to engage in libel and defamation, among other speech 
torts.  Although the Supreme Court has not yet defined the scope 
of disclosure requirements and speech protection, the Ninth Circuit 
has addressed this issue.  Specifically, in In re Anonymous Online 
Speakers, the Ninth Circuit was faced with the question of whether 
or not a plaintiff could subpoena the identity of an anonymous 
online user accused of interfering with the plaintiff’s business.27  
Ultimately, although the court recognized that online speech was 
entitled to the same protection as other speech, the subpoena was 
granted because the speech in question was not political and thus 
entitled to lower First Amendment protections.28  The judiciary has 
not yet created a specific rule for establishing how to regulate 
anonymous speech in regards to disclosure requirements nor 
identified the scrutiny under which those regulations are to be 
reviewed. 
B. State Regulation of Speech with an Identifiable Author 
Government censorship of speech and the press stems from the 
Statutes De Scandalis Magnatum, enacted in 1275, which imposed 
penalties for any distribution of anything false or critical of the 
                                                                                                             
25 Id. at 66–69. 
26 See discussion infra Part II. 
27 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011). 
28 Id. at 1173. 
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King of England.29  Censorship of speech continued throughout 
England and in the American colonies.  Colonial governments 
often suppressed speech as strongly as the English Parliament did, 
and much of the English common law was incorporated into the 
common law of the colonies.30  However, freedom of speech soon 
came to be considered a fundamental right.  Sir William 
Blackstone authoritatively described the right of free speech as a 
fundamental right that may still be in some ways regulated by 
government: 
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the 
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no 
previous restraints upon publications, and not in 
freedom from censure for criminal matter when 
published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to 
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; 
but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, 
or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own 
temerity.31 
During the Founding Era, even influential thinkers such as 
John Locke urged that “no opinions contrary to human society, or 
to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of 
civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate.”32  This caused 
problems during the ratification debates, as there was a split 
between proponents of the English common law and those, like 
James Madison, who endeavored to break from tradition and give 
speech more protection from government censorship. 33   For 
example, Madison urged a broad constitutional amendment that 
would prevent any deprivation or abridgment of “the right to 
speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of 
the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be 
                                                                                                             
29 See Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the 
Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 661, 668 (1985). 
30 See 2 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES 409 (7th ed. 2008). 
31 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52. 
32 See JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 
at 45–46 (Oxford Univ. Press 11th ed. 1934). 
33 See 2 O’BRIEN, supra note 30, at 410. 
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inviolable.”34  Madison stressed that liberty of the press was of 
utmost importance to the public and was the “bulwark of liberty.”35 
Madison’s view of freedom of speech and the press, however, 
was not representative of the majority views of the Founding Era.  
The colonies’ experience with censorship from England resulted in 
the widespread belief that a guarantee of freedom of speech and 
press was necessary but could be regulated by common law 
restrictions such as those on libel and slander.36  The newly formed 
United States of America ultimately adopted the First Amendment 
of the Bill of Rights, which prevents Congress—and, through the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the States as well—from 
making any laws abridging freedom of speech and the press.37  The 
First Amendment has had a tumultuous history as states have 
sought to regulate certain types of speech and the Supreme Court 
has been forced to intercede to address the constitutionality of such 
regulations. 
In response to the Espionage Act and state sedition laws, the 
Supreme Court developed a standard for interpreting the scope of 
First Amendment protections of speech.  One of the best-known 
tests for defining the scope of constitutionally protected speech by 
the First Amendment is the “clear and present danger” test 
illustrated by Justice Holmes in 1919 in Schenck v. United States.38  
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, noted that even “the most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in 
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”39  The Court 
in Schenck explained that Schenck’s leaflets advocating draft 
dodging presented a clear and present danger that Congress had a 
right to prevent, as it is not constitutionally protected speech.40  
Over time, the clear and present danger test was abandoned and a 
                                                                                                             
34 Id. 
35 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also 6 JAMES 
MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 336 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). 
36 See 2 O’BRIEN, supra note 30, at 412. 
37 See id. at 336, 412. 
38 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
39 Id. at 52. 
40 Id. at 53. 
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balancing approach was adopted that weighed First Amendment 
freedoms against government interests.41  
After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, decisions of 
the Supreme Court established that the First Amendment applied 
equally to the states; accordingly, the Court was tasked with 
defining the scope of constitutionally protected speech.42  It wasn’t 
until 1936 that the Supreme Court held that constitutional 
principles—as opposed to English common law—governed the 
scope of protected speech.43  Justice Sutherland unambiguously 
stated, “[i]t is impossible to concede that by the words ‘freedom of 
the press’ the framers of the amendment intended to adopt merely 
the narrow view then reflected by the law of England.”44  As a 
result, the Court was faced with numerous First Amendment 
challenges to state laws that attempted to restrict free speech. 
To determine whether a state may constitutionally proscribe 
speech, the Court must first ask whether the law attempts to 
regulate speech or conduct. 45   The Court also distinguishes 
between content-based regulations, which seek to restrict speech 
based on its content, and content-neutral regulations, which can be 
justified without reference to the content of the speech.46  Content-
neutral regulations such as time, place, and manner restrictions, 
although not unlimited, are subject to intermediate scrutiny 
requiring the state to show that the law is substantially related to an 
important governmental interest. 47   Content-based restrictions, 
however, are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict 
scrutiny.48 
                                                                                                             
41 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 494, 530 (1951). 
42 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (holding First Amendment 
freedoms to be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and “so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of the people as to be ranked as fundamental”). See generally Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920). 
43 See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936). 
44 Id. at 248. 
45 See Qasir, supra note 20, at 3656. 
46 See CHEMERINSKY supra note 5, at 960–62. 
47 See Qasir, supra note 20, at 3657. 
48 Id. at 3656–57. 
2014] FOUNDING ERA FREE SPEECH THEORY 833 
	
Although free speech is a fundamental right, the Court does not 
protect all speech equally.  The Supreme Court has established a 
hierarchy of speech protections with certain categories of speech 
considered to be disfavored and not presumptively protected by the 
First Amendment.49  The Court has created exceptions for state 
laws that regulate or limit disfavored speech. 50   Two such 
categories of disfavored speech include speech inciting violence 
and fighting words.51  The Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio struck 
down a law that convicted a Ku Klux Klan group leader of 
advocating violence.52  In Brandenburg, the Court explained that 
while the government has a compelling interest in preventing 
people from inciting violence, advocacy of violence is not 
problematic unless it is directly intended to produce imminent 
lawless action and is likely to induce such action.53  With state 
regulations that proscribe speech that is likely to incite violence, 
the Supreme Court has included an imminency requirement: 
simple advocacy of force does not remove speech from the 
protection of the First Amendment.54 
Fighting words, on the other hand, are thought to incite 
violence directed against the speaker rather than violence 
undertaken to further the speaker’s cause.  Typically, the claim is 
that provocative speech so enrages the audience that some listeners 
are likely to use violence against the speaker.  In Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, Justice Murphy unambiguously laid out the 
hierarchy of speech categories, noting that fighting words are less 
worthy of protection: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which has never been thought to raise any 
constitutional problem. These include the lewd and 
                                                                                                             
49 See CHEMERINSKY supra note 5, at 1017–19. 
50 Id. 
51 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
52 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–45. 
53 See id. at 447. 
54 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927–28 (1982). 
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obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting 
or ‘fighting words’ – those which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well 
observed that such utterances are no essential part 
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that 
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by 
the social interest in order and morality.55 
Again, the Court indicated that the First Amendment does not 
presumptively protect all speech.  In Cohen v. California, the 
Court distinguished fighting words from obscenity and included a 
“likelihood of violence” requirement for state regulation. 56   In 
Cohen, the Court struck down Cohen’s conviction, indicating that 
because there was no evidence showing that Cohen’s message, 
“Fuck the Draft,” was either intended to arouse or actually aroused 
a violent reaction, the message did not constitute fighting words.57  
Ultimately, speech that incites violence and fighting words are 
disfavored, but not entirely removed, from First Amendment 
protection.  However, the Court affords significantly more 
deference to the states to regulate or proscribe such speech so long 
as the imminency and likelihood of violence requirements are met. 
C. Cyberbullying: The Detrimental Effects of Unrestricted 
Cyberspeech on the Nation’s Youth 
Cyberbullying—the harassment of classmates, friends, 
enemies, or even strangers, on the Internet—has become 
increasingly prevalent in today’s society, especially among 
children and teenagers.  Unfortunately, the Internet has provided a 
new medium for individuals to anonymously, pseudonymously, or 
identifiably harass, embarrass, and threaten others.  The public 
nature of the Internet, specifically social media, makes the 
harassment especially harmful for children and teenagers who are 
at an impressionable age.  Furthermore, the immediacy of instant 
                                                                                                             
55 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (emphasis added). 
56 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
57 Id. at 20. 
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messaging, emailing, text messaging, and other messaging 
applications on cellphones has put this age group at a further 
disadvantage. 
There are numerous media through which individuals can use 
cyberspeech to spread hate and harass others without the victim’s 
participation.  Text messaging and the messenger application Kik, 
released in October of 2010 for smartphones, allow individuals to 
transmit messages and images to people’s phones, regardless of 
whether or not those people wish to receive them.  Kik allows 
individuals to identify themselves by a personalized username that 
may or may not have anything to do with their actual name or 
phone number.58  Applications such as Kik can be used to cloak 
the user in secrecy or create an entirely different persona, giving 
individuals yet another opportunity to harass their peers. 
The Honorable Brian P. Stern, Associate Justice, Rhode Island 
Superior Court, succinctly described cyberbullying and explained 
the harm it can, and does, cause: 
With the click of a mouse button and a few 
keystrokes, tormentors can reach their targets any 
time of day or night from anywhere in the world. 
Tormentors are instantly able to spread lies and 
embarrassing information about their victims to 
hundreds and thousands of people at a time. This 
24/7 widespread harassment can have a far more 
dangerous effect on the victim than traditional 
bullying.59 
Cyberbullying, much like traditional bullying, can cause 
psychological harm such as depression, anxiety, isolation, and low 
self-esteem. 60   Furthermore, the repercussions of cyberbullying 
often last longer as the harassing, embarrassing, or threatening 
                                                                                                             
58 See ABOUT KIK MESSENGER, http://kik.com/about (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). 
59 Hon. Brian P. Stern & Thomas Evans, Cyberbullying—An Age Old Problem, A New 
Generation, 59 R.I. BAR J. 21, 21 (2011). 
60 See Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the 
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 851 
(2010) (examining several cyberbulling instances and their negative repercussions). 
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comments remain in cyberspace indefinitely, able to be shared and 
re-shared with the simple click of a mouse.61 
Tragically, cyberbullying has been involved in recent suicides 
among teenagers and students.  In Missouri, a 47-year-old woman 
named Lori Drew pushed thirteen-year-old Megan Meier to suicide 
through cyberbullying.62  Drew, knowing that Megan was taking 
anti-depressants, concocted a fake MySpace account under the 
name Josh Evans and pretended to be a sixteen-year-old boy.63  
Under this pseudonym, Drew flirted with Megan for weeks but 
then began to harass and insult Megan, ultimately writing “[t]he 
world would be a better place without you.”64  After this final 
insult and the barrage of insults from “Josh” and others, Megan 
went to her room and hanged herself. 65   Though she arguably 
directly caused Megan’s suicide, Drew was never charged with a 
crime. 
Another highly publicized suicide attributed to cyberbullying is 
that of eighteen-year-old Rutgers University freshman Tyler 
Clementi in 2010.  On September 19, 2010, Clementi’s roommate, 
Dharun Ravi, also eighteen years old, tweeted that he saw 
Clementi “[m]aking out with a dude” and used his webcam to live 
stream Clementi’s intimate relations with another man in 
Clementi’s own dorm room. 66   Only three days later, Tyler 
Clementi posted a chilling message on his Facebook page, 
“[j]umping off the gw bridge sorry” and proceeded to commit 
suicide by jumping into the Hudson River.67  Ravi faced numerous 
charges including invasion of privacy and bias intimidation. 68  
                                                                                                             
61 See id. at 850–51. 
62 See Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No Charges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.html. 
63 See id. 
64 Id. 
65 See id. 
66 Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30suicide.html?page
wanted=all. 
67 Id. 
68 See Richard Pérez-Peña, Rutgers Dorm Spying Trial Begins with Questions of 
Motivation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/nyregion/in-
tyler-clementi-trial-looking-at-dharun-ravis-intentions.html. 
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Ultimately, Ravi was convicted on all counts, including the felony 
charges, and served thirty days in jail, avoiding deportation back to 
India.69 
More recently, a twelve-year-old girl in Florida has become 
one of the youngest victims driven to suicide by cyberbullying.70  
Rebecca was apparently cyberbullied by fifteen other middle 
school children for over a year and bombarded with insults and 
urges to kill herself through messaging apps such as Kik 
Messenger.71  Ultimately, two girls were charged with felonies for 
cyberbullying, but the charges were dropped because, although 
their messages were of the type that some children could find 
emotionally crushing, “the posts did not rise to the level of a 
crime.” 72   As technology advances, children and teenagers are 
constantly finding new ways to harass, embarrass, and threaten 
their peers.  As a result, more and more of the nation’s youth are 
being driven to suicide due to cyberbullying.73 
II. CYBERBULLYING AND SPEECH REGULATIONS IN CYBERSPACE: 
ANONYMOUS AND AUTHORED SPEECH AND HOW IT MAY BE 
REGULATED 
On the Internet, anonymous users can make use of a plethora of 
media to disseminate their opinions. The Internet allows the 
communication of text, sound, images, and pictures between 
devices and can be accessed at any time by any person with a 
                                                                                                             
69 See Kate Zernike, Rutgers Webcam-Spying Defendant Sentenced to 30 Days, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/nyregion/rutgers-spying-
defendant-sentenced-to-30-days-in-jail.html. 
70 Lizette Alvarez, Girl’s Suicide Points to Rise in Apps Used by Cyberbullies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/us/suicide-of-girl-after-
bullying-raises-worries-on-web-sites.html?_r=0. 
71 See id. 
72 Lizette Alvarez, Charges Dropped in Cyber-bullying Death, but Sheriff Isn’t 
Backing down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/
22/us/charges-dropped-against-florida-girls-accused-in-cyber-bullying-
death.html?_r=1&. 
73 See Kathleen Conn, Allegations of School District Liability for Bullying, 
Cyberbullying, and Teen Suicides After Sexting: Are New Legal Standards Emerging in 
the Courts?, 37 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 227, 223–24 (2011). 
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computer or other Internet-ready device.74  Since cyberspace is 
accessible without respect to geographic boundaries, “there is no 
current method to limit its accessibility to within state boundaries 
or selectively limit its dissemination to any geographic area.”75  As 
such, the law as it stands is insufficient to address harmful 
information disseminated on the internet.  Cyberspace has become 
a hotbed for destructive speech, cyberbullying, and “sexting,” as 
well as defamation, tortious interference with business, and 
copyright infringement.76  As a result, many states are imposing 
criminal penalties for the sharing of sexually explicit materials 
involving children.  For example, New York has enacted the Cyber 
Crimes Youth Rescue Act, mandating an eight-hour educational 
program for youths accused of sharing sexually explicit images of 
other minors.77 
Many early cyberspeech regulations focused on minors, but 
were not entirely efficient.  In response to the perceived danger 
that “predatory adults will expose minors” to harmful matter on the 
Internet, Congress and several states – California, New York, New 
Mexico, Michigan, and Virginia – have enacted penal statutes 
criminalizing the “dissemination of harmful matter to minors over 
the Internet.”78  The Court has consistently justified protection of 
minors as a compelling state interest warranting regulation of 
certain types of speech.79  With respect to the Internet, however, 
the Court has found these types of regulations to be overbroad.80  
Enacted by Congress, section 223 of the Communications Decency 
Act of 1996 (CDA) sought to prohibit any sexually explicit 
                                                                                                             
74 See Alex C. McDonald, Dissemination of Harmful Matter to Minors over the 
Internet, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 163, 166–67 (2001). 
75 Id. at 168. 
76 See Qasir, supra note 20. 
77 Cybercrime Youth Rescue Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws A. 8170-B (McKinney). 
78 See McDonald, supra note 74, at 163–64. 
79 See generally Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children from Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 
565 (2005) (examining the First Amendment concerns inherent in the concept of 
sheltering children from otherwise free speech). 
80 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); Reno v. Am. 
Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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communications from use in telecommunications. 81   The law 
specifically sought, in § 223(a), to criminalize the “knowing 
transmission of obscene or indecent messages” to minors,82 and in 
§ 223(d) to criminalize sending or displaying a message to a minor 
“that, in any context, depicts or describes [in offensive terms . . . ] 
sexual or excretory activities or organs.”83 This law, however, was 
entirely focused on the availability of offensive material to minors, 
not all Internet users. 
Shortly after its enactment, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) challenged the constitutionality of § 223(a)(1) and § 
223(d) in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.84  Writing for 
the majority, Justice Stevens recognized the “importance of the 
congressional goal of protecting children from harmful materials,” 
but ultimately found that the statute abridged First Amendment 
protections of freedom of speech.85  Justice Stevens noted that the 
CDA applied broadly to all aspects of cyberspace and was 
therefore a content-based regulation of speech that must be 
evaluated under strict scrutiny.86  Although the statute was found 
to be impermissibly broad, in dicta, Justice Stevens discussed an 
attribute of cyberspace that has significantly changed in today’s 
society as opposed to that of 1997.87  He noted that the Internet is 
“not as ‘invasive’ as radio or television,” and agreed with the 
district court that “[c]ommunications over the Internet do not 
‘invade’ an individual’s home or appear on one’s computer screen 
unbidden.”88  In making this determination, Justice Stevens likened 
cyberspace to the press, a less invasive medium for expression.  
However, the Internet has changed drastically since 1997 and has 
become significantly more immediate and intertwined in daily life.  
                                                                                                             
81 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, invalidated in 
part by Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
82 Id. § 223(a). 
83 Id. § 223(d). 
84 521 U.S. 844. 
85 Id. at 849. 
86 Id. at 868. 
87 Id. at 868–69. 
88 Id. at 869 (quoting Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996)). 
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Additionally, children and minors make up a significant portion of 
Internet users. 
Another example of regulation of cyberspeech directed at 
minors, since held by the Court to be unconstitutional,89 was the 
Child Online Protection Act (COPA), which criminalized 
transmission over the Internet, for commercial purposes, of 
material “harmful to minors.”90   In Ashcroft v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, the Court enjoined the enforcement of the Child 
Online Protection Act of 1998 for burdening adult access to 
protected speech. 91   Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
upheld the district court’s injunction and remanded the case for 
further examination on the issue of whether there were less 
restrictive alternatives to COPA.92  Justice Kennedy reiterated that 
content-based prohibitions have the “constant potential to be a 
repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a free people,” and are 
thus presumptively invalid.93  Although COPA was struck down, 
the Court did note that other forms of restricting speech on the 
Internet, such as prohibitions on misleading domain names, are 
valid. 94   Still, the laws regarding prohibitions of misleading 
information are not adequate to address cyberbullying or other 
dissemination of harmful information on the Internet. 
Aside from protection of minors, personal privacy is another 
issue Congress and states look to in justifying regulations.  
Although the Court has recognized a right to privacy implicit in the 
penumbras of the Constitution, 95  privacy torts are “of limited 
utility when applied to the Internet.”96  One example of the failure 
of tort law in cyberspace is the case of Boring v. Google, Inc., 
where the Borings sued Google for taking images of their home on 
                                                                                                             
89 See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008); see also 
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
90 Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998). 
91 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
92 Id. at 660. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 663 (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 2252B). 
95 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
96 See Terence J. Lau, Towards Zero Net Presence, 25 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 237, 264 (2011). 
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a private road for dissemination on Google’s “Street View” 
mapping program.97  There, the district court dismissed the suit for 
invasion of privacy because of a failure to establish Google’s 
conduct as “highly offensive to a person of ordinary 
sensibilities.”98 
There have also been attempts to protect online privacy 
through the use of criminal laws.  Various states have enacted 
criminal laws to address cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and 
cyberbullying. 99   However, there is currently no federal law 
addressing cyberharassment or cyberbullying. 100   Congress has 
taken some steps to regulate the Internet, such as enacting the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which criminalizes 
computer fraud.101  However, in United States v. Drew, a case in 
which a mother created a fake MySpace profile of a teenage boy to 
harass and bully a teenage girl, the district court held the law to be 
unconstitutionally vague.102 
Some commentators believe that even the states that do attempt 
to regulate and protect online privacy are unsuccessful in their 
efforts.  Terence J. Lau, Associate Professor, University of Dayton, 
describes state regulation of online privacy as “meager and 
pitiful.”103  Blogs, for instance, are an area of concern for online 
privacy regulation.  Although multifaceted, blogs are popularly 
used by children and teenagers, and can become virtual diaries that 
are shared throughout cyberspace.104  Currently, speech of private 
concern on the Internet is given less protection than speech of 
public concern, somewhat limiting bloggers’ rights to engage in 
                                                                                                             
97 362 F. App’x 273, 276 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 150 (2010). 
98 Id. at 277 (quoting Boring v. Google, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 695, 699–700 (W.D. Pa. 
2009)). 
99 See, e.g., Sarah Jameson, Cyberharassment: Striking a Balance Between Free 
Speech and Privacy, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 231, 258–60 (2008); Lau, supra note 
96, at 266. 
100 See Lau, supra note 96, at 266. 
101 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
102 United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 464 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
103 See Lau, supra note 96, at 266. 
104 See, e.g., Alan J. Bojorquez & Damien Shores, Open Government and the Net: 
Bringing Social Media into the Light, 11 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 45, 48–49 (2009). 
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online gossip.105  Overall, however, there is little state regulation in 
this area today. 
The state regulation that exists in this area is, at this point, 
insufficient.  Much of it focuses solely on the protection of minors 
or privacy.  Furthermore, federal regulations, such as the CDA, 
COPA, and CFAA, do not sufficiently fill the gaps left by state 
laws.  As there are currently no federal laws addressing 
cyberharassment or cyberbullying, the Internet remains a 
potentially dangerous place in need of regulations.106  The law as it 
stands, in its current state, is inadequate to address cyberbullying 
and must be amended.  Ultimately, both federal and state 
regulations of cyberspeech fall short of addressing free speech 
concerns while still serving governmental interests. 
III. CREATING A PROPER STANDARD TO EVALUATE CYBERSPEECH 
REGULATIONS: RESURRECTING THE TRADITIONAL HIERARCHY OF 
PROTECTED SPEECH 
First Amendment law with respect to free speech should be 
used to govern cyberbullying.  Applying the traditional hierarchy 
of protected speech to cyberspeech would remedy the current 
inadequacies in the current laws regulating cyberspeech.  In the 
United States, freedom of speech is a fundamental right but it is 
not absolute, and certain types of speech are subject to 
governmental regulation.  Cyberbullying on the Internet must be 
regulated, but currently there are no uniform standards for federal 
or state regulation of such harmful speech.  The First Amendment 
guarantees both the freedom of speech and of the press, and 
protections of expressions made in cyberspace are more analogous 
to the protections afforded speech than those bestowed upon the 
press.  As such, traditional standards of scrutiny should govern the 
Court’s analysis of state regulations.  Part III.A discusses some of 
the challenges inherent in regulating anonymous cyberspeech and 
reasons that cyberspeech unequivocally falls under First 
                                                                                                             
105 Daniel J. Solove, A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech & Privacy in the 
Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195, 1198 (2006). 
106 See Lau, supra note 96, at 266. 
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Amendment protections and regulations.  Part III.B argues that the 
immense reach of the Internet, permeating everyday life, renders 
cyberspeech more akin to freedom of speech rather than to 
freedom of the press and, accordingly, places cyberbullying in the 
disfavored speech category of speech that incites violence or 
fighting words.  Finally, Part III.C applies the traditional hierarchy 
of protected speech to cyberspeech presenting guidelines for how 
courts and legislatures should approach cyberbullying.  Ultimately, 
both state and federal governments should regulate cyberspeech in 
the same manner and to the same extent as they may regulate the 
spoken word. 
A. Some of the Challenges Inherent in Regulating Anonymous 
Cyberspeech 
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects 
speech in cyberspace but that such protection is not absolute.107  
Congress and the states have attempted to regulate cyberspeech in 
one way or another, though such attempts are inevitably restricted 
by the scope of the First Amendment.  As a result of years of 
accumulating Supreme Court jurisprudence, states are afforded 
“wide latitude in regulating classes of speech that offer such 
negligible social value” as to be outweighed by social interests in 
order and social morality.108  Although cyberbullying clearly offers 
little to no social value, legislators are tasked with crafting 
cyberspeech laws that do not infringe upon protected speech 
rights.109 
It is clear that anonymous speech is protected by the 
Constitution and has been since the Founding Era. 110   In the 
Founding Era, anonymous speech was protected in order to 
encourage political speech such as that found in the Federalist 
Papers and Anti-Federalist Papers.111  These types of anonymous 
speech were protected because of the value of encouraging 
                                                                                                             
107 See Qasir, supra note 20, at 3653. 
108 See King, supra note 60, at 865. 
109 Id. at 865–66. 
110 See Qasir, supra note 20, at 3652. 
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political discourse.  The Founders did not seek to protect 
anonymous speech so as to encourage harassment, which is what 
unrestricted cyberspeech fosters today.  Furthermore, from an 
originalist perspective, “most of modern First Amendment doctrine 
is incompatible with the original understanding of the freedom of 
the press.” 112   The policies and principles for protecting 
anonymous speech and the press in the Founding Era are no longer 
as relevant in the Internet era.  Cyberspeech that fosters intelligent 
or political discourse should naturally be protected regardless of 
whether or not it is anonymous.  However, even originalist 
principles cannot justify protecting anonymous cyberspeech that 
fosters hate and cyberbullying. 
There are also privacy concerns regarding regulation of 
anonymous cyberspeech.  The Supreme Court has already 
restrained the right to anonymous speech by imposing disclosure 
requirements in campaign finance laws. 113   However, these 
mandatory disclosure laws would have a different effect on 
cyberspeech.  First, privacy concerns may outweigh a mandatory 
disclosure as individuals have the right to voluntarily disclose what 
aspects, if any, of their identity that they wish to express. 114  
Imposing a mandatory disclosure requirement could destroy all 
anonymity on the Internet and, if taken to the extreme, could 
destroy the voluntariness of cyberspace.  Furthermore, courts have 
found that the justifications115 for restriction of anonymous speech 
in printed media, such as corruption in campaign finance, “do not 
apply to online speech, and the government should protect 
speakers’ legitimate expectations of privacy.”116  However, it is 
unclear exactly how much privacy the Supreme Court aimed to 
protect when protecting anonymous speech: it is possible that the 
Supreme Court was “protecting political privacy rather than 
                                                                                                             
112 Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: 
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 754 (2013) 
(internal citations omitted). 
113 See Qasir, supra note 20, at 3665. 
114 See Qasir, supra note 20, at 3660–61. 
115 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
116 See Qasir, supra note 20, at 3667–68. 
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creating a broad right to anonymity.”117  Placing broad restrictions 
on anonymous cyberspeech that would require identity disclosure 
has the potential to change the entire character of the Internet and 
eliminate any expectation of privacy that individuals are entitled to 
under the Constitution. 
The current regulations regarding cyberbullying are met with 
various challenges.  Much of the legislation attempting to regulate 
cyberbullying is found in a state’s education statutes rather than in 
penal codes.118  Most laws prohibit cyberbullying in the public-
school context, which gives more responsibility to teachers and 
administrators to combat online harassment.119  Furthermore, the 
current regulations are often perceived as inadequate as the laws 
“are not always written to deal with the nuances of 
cyberbullying.”120  Specifically, victims of cyberbulling more often 
than not have no legal remedy they can turn to for recourse.121  
Although victims can often rely on harassment or cyberstalking 
laws, these have proven to be inadequate solutions to the problem 
of cyberbullying. 122  Ultimately, the current regulations attempt to 
avoid important First Amendment questions but as a result are 
insufficient to serve their intended aim of combating 
cyberbullying. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that the First Amendment 
protects speech in cyberspace. 123   In examining the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Justice Stevens established 
that certain types of speech-based regulations in cyberspace could 
be potentially overbroad. 124   Although Justice Stevens likened 
cyberspace to the less-invasive press medium, the Internet has 
                                                                                                             
117 Id. at 3670. 
118 See John Schwartz, Bullying, Suicide, Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, 
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evolved significantly since then.125  Accordingly, First Amendment 
protections are becoming more prevalent in the courts and 
regulations are being passed more frequently. 126   Ultimately, 
cyberspeech is speech and, therefore, is subject to the protections 
and limitations established by the First Amendment.  The 
remaining questions concern the extent to which that speech may 
be regulated by government without infringing upon those First 
Amendment protections. 
B. The Vast Reach & Impact of Cyberspeech: Analogous to 
Traditional Speech Categories 
The Internet is omnipresent in today’s society, permeating even 
the most intimate aspects of individuals’ lives.  There is no longer 
a waiting period for news or writing to reach the desired recipient 
or audience; rather, a message can now be delivered within 
seconds of its creation.  Especially with the increasing popularity 
of social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, 
communication has become easier and more pervasive.  All that is 
required to view, receive, or create any form of cyberspeech is Wi-
Fi access or any form of Internet connection.  As such, 
cyberspeech is more similar to speech than to the press and should 
be regulated according to the rules of freedom of speech rather 
than the principles of freedom of the press.127 
Furthermore, cyberbullying is analogous to both speech that 
incites violence and to fighting words.128  These speech categories 
are traditionally considered to be of low value, and thus disfavored 
by the First Amendment, and do not receive presumptive 
protection.129  The same type of speech printed on the Internet 
should thus be regulated according to the same standards and those 
                                                                                                             
125 Id. 
126 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (holding that 
speech that materially assists a foreign terrorist organization can be constitutionally 
punished); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (excluding offers or requests 
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regulations reviewed under the same level of scrutiny.  Hate 
speech, threats, and other insults that incite violence and that are 
published on the Internet, do not deserve presumptive protection 
and should be regulated by Congress and the states. 
The instantaneous nature of the Internet is what likens 
cyberbullying to speech that incites violence and fighting words.  
The main concern with speech that incites violence and fighting 
words is in the likelihood of imminent lawless action.130  With 
social media and the Internet pervading virtually all aspects of life, 
it is increasingly likely that hateful speech, such as that involved in 
cyberbullying, will result in immediate violent action.  As noted 
above, cyberbullying has already led to an increased number of 
suicides among teenagers, which is unambiguously a negative 
consequence of cyberspeech.131 
Additionally, not all cyberspeech is posted in cyberspace to 
passively await an audience.  Rather, much cyberspeech is instead 
directed at individuals and reaches them more immediately.  
Texting and messaging apps like Kik assume an active role, 
bombarding the message recipient with notifications that a 
message has been received.132  Sometimes a recipient need not 
open the application to read the message they have received.  
Imminent lawless action or violence against the speaker is not only 
possible in such situations, but at times may even be probable.  In 
today’s society, where the Internet’s reach is so vast and its use so 
prevalent, cyberspeech, especially cyberbullying, is clearly 
analogous to speech that incites violence and fighting words.  As 
such, the traditional hierarchy of favored versus disfavored speech 
should be applied to cyberspeech, and cyberbullying should be 
regulated accordingly as this form of speech falls into the 
disfavored category of speech that incites violence and fighting 
words. 
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C. Applying the Traditional Hierarchy to Cyberspeech 
First Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh expertly argues that 
controversies about cyberspeech should “be driven not by the 
medium, but by the relatively medium-independent underlying free 
speech principles.” 133   The current methods of regulating 
cyberspeech are inadequate insofar as they are largely dependent 
on other laws, including education reform and criminal harassment 
laws. 134   Because the Internet is a medium for speech, both 
authored and anonymous, that speech should be regulated under 
traditional speech standards.  However, these laws are often 
overbroad and do not actually provide a sufficient remedy for 
victims of cyberbullying.  Harassment law, for example, “operates 
to generally suppress speech.” 135   Additionally, the laws for 
cyberharassment are not necessarily unique to cyberspace and have 
little to do with the actual medium of cyberspace.136 
Evaluating content-based restrictions on cyberspeech reveals 
that the online medium is largely irrelevant to the actual restriction 
on speech.137  Because the Internet is instantaneous, it is highly 
probable that certain speech would incite imminent lawless action.  
The imminence requirement is easily met given that messages 
posted in cyberspace are instantly transmitted throughout 
cyberspace to thousands of users.  The same is true for 
cyberspeech that may incite violence against the speaker.  Fighting 
words on the Internet are more pervasive than those simply 
displayed in public, for example on a jacket.138  The messages that 
teenagers spread throughout cyberspace frequently lead to violence 
and tragically to an increasing number of suicides.139 
In arguing for the passage of the Online Freedom of Speech 
Act, Senator Bill Frist noted that “the Internet represents the most 
                                                                                                             
133 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, and Harassment Law, 2001 STAN. 
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participatory form of mass speech in human history.” 140   The 
purpose of the Online Freedom of Speech Act was to protect the 
privacy of bloggers and ensure that the expression of political 
views on the Internet was not infringed upon.141  While this is a 
legitimate concern, the law itself does not address the need for a 
proper and uniform standard for regulating cyberspeech.  The 
Internet is exceptionally participatory and is a highly effective 
medium for the spread of political opinions and intelligent 
discourse.  However, cyberspace is also a medium for hateful 
speech that is highly detrimental to the nation’s youth.  Congress 
and the states have a duty to protect the nation’s youth, and 
cyberspeech accordingly should be regulated based on its content. 
The proper standard for regulating cyberspeech is to simply 
resurrect the traditional hierarchy of protected speech and apply it 
in the context of cyberspace.142 
Applying this traditional hierarchy to cyberspeech, it is easy to 
determine into which categories  different types of cyberspeech 
will fall.  For example, a product description on the Amazon 
website would be commercial speech and a product review on the 
same website would likely fall into the same category.  Messages 
posted on a comment board about politics, tweets about current 
events, and messages posted on a candidate’s webpage would 
likely fall into the category of political discourse and would thus 
be protected.  Cyberbullying, however, clearly falls into the 
categories of speech that incite violence and fighting words.  
Ultimately, applying the traditional First Amendment hierarchy to 
online speech results in cyberbullying falling under the categories 
of speech that incite violence and fighting words.  As these are 
historically disfavored categories of speech that do not enjoy 
presumptive protection, cyberbullying thus falls under the purview 
of Congress and the states to regulate. 
                                                                                                             
140 152 CONG. REC. S1954-02 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2006) (statement of Sen. Frist). 
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142 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech, 
anonymous and authored, written and spoken, in the tangible 
sphere and in cyberspace.143  Speech protection is neither absolute 
nor equal for all types of speech.  There is a hierarchy in which 
certain categories, such as fighting words, are disfavored and 
largely unprotected from governmental regulation, and other 
categories, such as political discourse, are granted presumptive 
protection. 144   Anonymous speech occurs in both of these 
categories.  Specifically in cyberspace, anonymous speech is used 
to instantly spread hateful and harmful speech.  This has led to an 
increase in teenage suicides resulting from cyberbullying.  Current 
federal and state attempts to regulate speech are inadequate and 
often under-inclusive or overbroad, resulting in significant First 
Amendment challenges. 
Speech, both anonymous and authored, that is published on the 
Internet is more analogous to the spoken word than to publications 
in the press and should therefore be governed by speech freedom 
rather than press freedom.  The cyberspace medium itself should 
not dictate the means through which speech is regulated.  Instead, 
the traditional hierarchy of speech protections should be applied to 
cyberspeech.  Cyberbullying, with its immediacy and intimate 
involvement in everyday life, should be regulated in the same way 
as speech that incites violence or fighting words.  Therefore, 
cyberbullying should be considered a disfavored category of 
speech, one that has low social value, which may thus be regulated 
by Congress and the states.  The Court should recognize that 
cyberspeech is on the same level as spoken speech, and that 
governmental regulations attempting to proscribe the type of 
speech found in cyberbullying should be reviewed under strict 
scrutiny, with the highest deference afforded to the government.  
Moving forward, states must be able to regulate anonymous 
cyberspeech in the same manner and to the same extent that they 
may regulate the spoken word. 
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